4. The judge dealt with the case quite shortly. There were, in addition to the matters I have referred to, two other causes of difficulty. One was the mother's appearance on television on behalf of the National Council for Single Parents showing E on that programme, part of which dealt with the irresponsibility of those fathers who fail to support their children and are therefore pursued by the Child Support Agency. The mother did, however, satisfy the judge that nothing in either of the programmes identified the father or was in any other sense derogatory of him. It is difficult to see how the father can go behind that finding.
5. The second matter relating to breast feeding was that father felt that the "breast-feeding deception" - that is to say the passing of blame away from the mother who was abusing the situation on to the father, who was coming for his entitled contact - would be avoided if a third party was involved in the handover. But the mother said she saw no need or purpose in that because she is supportive of contact and wishes it to continue. The judge agreed with her. Again, it is difficult to see how the father can ever show that that was a plainly wrong conclusion.
6. Finally, the judge relied upon the fact that no contact had taken place since early in August. The judge held that since the father had unilaterally missed 24 contact sessions, then until he indicated a willingness to take up the contact he was offered there was little point in giving him any extended contact. Again, it is a conclusion impossible to attack.
7. The father makes the point, which has logical appeal, that if two hours was sufficient when the baby was being breast-fed, now that he is not a longer period can be allowed. The answer to that is that at two years of age two hours is still a long time, and for the time being well within the ordinary range of order that a judge could make, as Judge Milligan did. It is not outside the generous ambit within which there is room for reasonable disagreement. I see therefore no reasonable prospect of successfully appealing the order in respect of contact.
8. As for the section 91(14) direction, the judge was of the view that the frequency of the applications coming before the court were having an adverse effect on the mother and through her on the child, and he was of the opinion that (page 49):
"In those circumstances, I have no hesitation in reaching the view that the applicant father by his repeated applications is acting in a manner abusive of the right of access to the courts, he is acting in a vexatious, frivolous and, so far as the mother and son are concerned, oppressive manner and that this is a case where I should make a further section 91(14) Order, bearing in mind as I do the injunction in the authorities that such orders are rare and should only are be made when, as I have said, abuse of the right of access to the courts is found with a consequent effect upon the mother and son."
10. I have explained to the father that he is barred from making an application on notice to the mother. He may, if he is anxious to do so, approach the court without notice to the mother to seek permission to make an application. I urge him very strongly to resist the temptation to go back to Judge Milligan too soon because he will do his cause more harm than good. I have urged him to take up the contact that he has on offer and once that is restored, is up and running and the benefits of it are obvious to all, and obvious even, I dare say, to the mother, then, failing her agreement to extend contact, then - but only then - may it be appropriate for him to seek the permission.
11. I see the force of the argument that to wait until the boy is four before going back to the court is harsh but the judgment is beyond appeal. Accordingly I dismiss both applications.
ORDER: Applications dismissed.